

SECRET

## GUIDELINES -- TALKING POINTS

1. DCI warning assessments are intended to fill the gap between estimative and current intelligence.
2. They will provide a succinct and incisive evaluation of the warning outlook from the DCI's perspective, covering roughly a period of 60 to 90 days. They will not contain a review of current intelligence; it will be assumed that consumers are well briefed on current facts and events. Assessments will focus primarily on foreign intentions and on motives, calculations, and factors likely to condition decisions and actions.
3. The objective will be to provide the earliest possible warning of potential surprise and of actions that may affect US security, political, and economic interests.
4. Assessments will be based on intelligence reporting to the extent possible, but they will necessarily be speculative, particularly in the early stages of a potential warning situation. Speculative projections will focus on the possibilities inherent in a potential or developing situation, outline alternative courses of action, and weigh the alternatives in terms of probability.
5. Assessments will be highly selective--perhaps 4 to 6 items a month--and will address only those potential developments of the greatest consequence for US interests. They are not intended as a "global" current intelligence briefing.
6. DCI warning assessments will provide greater in-depth treatment than is possible in the DCI Watch Committee reports and the NIO monthly warning reports.
7. The assessments will be drafted by the NIOs and will reflect their personal evaluations of the warning outlook in their respective regions. On occasion, assessments should take note of divergent or conflicting analyses and/or minority views in the community. They also should cite particularly cogent field assessments from embassies or stations or from foreign intelligence services and foreign ministries when these views depart from the prevailing Washington consensus. Assessments will represent the DCI's outlook and will not be coordinated with other NFIB agencies.
8. Assessments will include brief evaluations of collection, together with recommendations for additional reporting, either in the body of the text or in annexes, as appropriate.

VC/NIC Chrono

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.  
Vice Chairman, NIC

SUBJECT : Evaluation of HUMINT Requirements

1. At the 3 September DCI-NIO meeting we discussed the NIO perception that an objective evaluation should be made of the effectiveness of the current HUMINT Collection Plans and the FOCUS Reviews. The collective NIO recommendation was to have the Inspectors General perform this evaluation but you indicated some skepticism about their capability to do such an evaluation in a timely fashion.

2. In view of your expressed preference for an ad hoc group to perform this evaluation, I suggest that you consider appointing some highly respected retired professional intelligence officers to this task. [redacted] recently retired [redacted] would be an ideal candidate to head a small ad hoc group such as this. The community aspects of the HUMINT requirements system could be accommodated by appointing a former Foreign Service Officer and a former military attache to assist him. A group such as this could then report directly to you or to you through the Intelligence Community Staff.

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H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

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